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Abstract
The existing literature assumes that unemployment insurance (UI) a↵ects the labor market
through the job finding rate of eligible workers. I argue that this focus is too narrow. I show
evidence for UI e↵ects through three other margins: (i) search externalities; (ii) takeup of other
welfare state programs; and (iii) job separations. This suggests that the analysis of optimal UI
should take a more comprehensive view of how UI a↵ects the labor market.
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1 Introduction
Since the Great Recession of 2008/2009, unemployment insurance (UI) and its impact on labor
market outcomes ranks again among the hot topics, both in policy debates and in academic research.
An important reason for the renewed interest is the debate on extended unemployment benefits in
the US during the Great Recession. During 2008-2011 the maximum duration of UI benefits were
extended to a hitherto unkown extent, with many states granting a maximum of 99 weeks UI benefit
duration. These expansions, which were eventually rolled back in 2012 and 2013, initiated a hot
political debate about their usefulness. For instance, Robert Barro (2010) entitled his provocative
Wall Street Journal op-ed “The folly of subsidizing unemployment”, and concluded that, in the
absence of extended UI benefits, US unemployment would never have exceeded 7 percent, when
it actually peaked at 10 percent. Paul Krugman (NYT 2013), on the other hand, argues that
extending UI benefits in bad times contributes as little to the increase in unemployment, as the
increase of a speed limit can contribute to the resolution of a tra c jam. In recessions, there is a
lack of jobs. Making the unemployed more desparate will not induce firms to hire more workers.
UI is one of the most important welfare state programs. Almost all industrialized countries
established UI systems after WWI or in response to the Great Depression. Many developing
countries have recently – or are about to – set up such a system. In Europe, many countries
expanded UI generosity during the post-war boom of the 1960s and early 1970s. As European
unemployment started to rise above US levels in the 1980s, many writers – most prominently
Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998, 2008) – pointed to excessive UI generosity as a possible explanation.
High UI benefits make unemployed workers reluctant to take jobs, slow down the reallocation of
labor and create “Eurosclerosis”, low productivity growth and high unemployment. Diagnoses
along these lines called for a reduction in UI generosity as an important element of the “structural
reforms” to improve labor market flexibility. A substantial body of empirical research evaluating
these UI policies has emerged since then, which has improved our knowledge of the quantitative
impact of UI policy parameters on unemployment durations.
Recent work in labor (and public) economics has made substantial progress in better under-
standing the impact of unemployment insurance on the labor market, as documented in a recent
survey by Schmieder and von Wachter (2016). Empirical work has come up with convincing de-
signs to estimate the causal impact of UI parameters on the duration of unemployment (and other
post-unemployment outcomes). On the theoretical side, Chetty (2006) showed that the old Baily
(1978) optimal-UI formula is much more generally applicable than previously thought; and that it
helps to make better sense of our empirical estimates. Baily’s (1978) formula can be stated as
u0(b)  u0(w   ⌧)
u0(w   ⌧) = ⌘
D
b ,
where u0(c) is marginal utility when consumption is c, w ⌧ is the net wage, b is the UI benefit, and
⌘Db is the elasticity of unemployment duration D with respect to (balanced-budget increases of) b.
It is this elasticity, which is estimated in a typical UI study. The above formula captures the most
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simple case when workers don’t save, hence during employment c = w and during unemployment
c = b. The formula is very intuitive: in the absence of moral hazard, when ⌘Db = 0, it is socially
optimal to fully ensure workers, i.e. to set b = w   ⌧. The higher is ⌘Db (and the lower the degree
of risk aversion, captured by u0(c)), the less generous is optimal UI.
This approach had a huge impact on the literature. Any new UI study providing a “causal”
estimate of ⌘Db uses the Baily formula to make welfare statements. With a functional-form assump-
tion on u0(.), the (local) optimality of UI generosity (b relative to w   ⌧) can be evaluated: if the
required degree of risk aversion is unplausibly high (low), the system under consideration is too
generous (too restrictive).
In this lecture, I argue that the Baily-Chetty approach is too narrow. The reason is that the
formula captures only one channel through which UI a↵ects the labor market: the reduced search
e↵ort by unemployed workers. While this channel is undoubtedly important, also other margins
respond to UI parameters and these responses may be quantitatively relevant. Not taking them
into account may lead to a biased assessment of the social optimality of an existing UI system. In
other words, a clean causal estimate of the duration elasticity ⌘Db is not enough to evaluate the
social optimality of a UI system.1 Three such channels will be discussed in this lecture:
1. Market externalities (and general equilibrium responses) of UI
2. UI and other welfare state programs
3. UI and job separations
In what follows I aim to shed light on the above channels by drawing on the work that my co-
authors and I have produced in previous and ongoing projects. These results indicate that the above
margins are indeed quantitatively relevant. However, they should be considered as an illustration
as their external validity is not clear and needs to be discussed. At the end of the lecture, I will
put these results into perspective and will draw some general conclusions.
2 Market externalities of UI extensions
The chances of an unemployed worker to find a new job do not only depend on the worker’s
search e↵ort but also on labor market conditions. The generosity of UI a↵ects these conditions. On
the one hand, a more generous UI system improves unemployed workers’ outside opportunities and
puts an upward pressure on wages in new jobs. Firms become more reluctant to open vacancies
making it harder to find a new job. On the other hand, a more generous UI system induces workers
to search less hard, thereby reducing competition for a limited number of vacancies. When all other
unemployed workers search less hard, it becomes easier for me to find a new job.
1The other key parameters of the Baily-Chetty formula will not be studied in this paper. One important strand
of the literature has looked at the relative importance of liquidity and moral hazard, see Chetty (2008), Card, Chetty
and Weber (2007) and Landais (2015). Essentially, this approach compares job losers with and without liquid assets to
better understand the consumption smoothing benefits of UI. Another approach, starting with Gruber (1997), looks
directly at changes in consumer expenditures follwing a job loss and how the generosity of UI a↵ects th response in
expenditures. For recent contributions, see Kroft and Notwidigdo (2016) and Ganong and Noel (2017).
2
Micro versus macro e↵ects of UI. These di↵erential labor market reponses are captured in
Figures 1 and 2. (The exposition follows Michaillat (2012).) On the horizontal axis, we measure –
as usual – labor supply and labor demand. On the vertical axis, we measure labor market tightness
✓ (= open vacancies per unit of aggregate search). Labor supply and labor demand curves are
drawn for a given wage rate and a given search intensity of the unemployed.
Labor supply is increasing in ✓. For a given search intensity of unemployed workers, a higher
✓ makes it is easier to find a new job. Importantly, higher UI generosity reduces unemployed
workers’ search intensity and shifts the labor supply curve to the left.2 The slope of the labor
demand curve is not a priori clear and depends on further assumptions. Figure 1 captures the
prediction of a standard search- and matching model a la Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP).
In the DMP framework, wages are flexible and worker productivity is constant. This implies a flat
labor demand curve at ✓0, which is pinned down by the zero profit condition for posting a vacancy.
An increase in UI generosity puts an upward pressure on wages and reduces the incentive to post
vacancies. This shifts the labor demand curve downward. In the new equilibrium tightness falls to
✓1 and employment falls to E2. It is easy to see that a clean causal (micro) estimate of the e↵ect
of UI on the job finding rate – comparing workers with di↵erent UI generosity but identical labor
market conditions – predicts a smaller employment reduction to E1, thus underestimating the labor
market response of UI.
Figure 1
A di↵erent model is presented in Figure 2. Here it is assumed that wages are rigid and the
marginal product of labor is falling. This corresponds to the case of “job rationing” studied in
Michaillat (2012).3 Under these assumptions, the labor demand curve slopes downward. When
tightness is low, filling a vacancy is less costly and firms are willing to employ more workers. Just
like before, the labor supply curve shifts to the left. However, due to the assumption of wage rigidity,
the labor demand curve remains una↵ected. The new labor market equilibrium is associated with
lower employment E2, but with higher tighness ✓2.
Figure 2
The two models generate di↵erent predictions about the relative size of micro and macro re-
sponses. The DMP model predicts that equilibrium tightness will fall. In that case, the micro e↵ect
falls short of the macro e↵ect. The micro e↵ect fails to capture the wage externality which exacer-
bates the negative e↵ect of UI on employment. In contrast, the job rationing model predicts that
equilibrium tightness will increase. In that case, the micro e↵ect exceeds the macro e↵ect. More
generous UI induces the unemployed to search less hard for a job, thereby reducing competition for
2✓ determines the job finding rate per unit of search, f(✓). The worker’s job finding rate is ef(✓). The shift of
the labor supply curve occurs, because higher UI generosity reduces search e↵ort e, at any given level of ✓.
3Michaillat (2012) argues that jobs are “rationed” in the sense that, even when tightness goes to zero (so that
vacancies are filled immediately and no cost of vacancy posting accrue), worker productivity at full employment may
fall short of the (rigid) wage. In such a situation there is unemployment even in the complete absence of frictions.
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new jobs. The micro e↵ect does not capture this search externality which mitigates the negative
e↵ect of UI on employment.
Empirically, we can observe the individual job finding rates, e ⇥ f(✓), but we usually cannot
separately observe search e↵ort e and the job finding rate per unit of search f(✓).4 To identify
market externalities, we need both a treated and a non-treated labor market, and variation in
treatment status across worker within the treated market. Let us index by T and N the treated
and non-treated labor market, respectively. Assume the treated labor market consists of eligible and
non-eligible workers, indexed by t and n, with population shares p and 1  p, respectively. Workers
of the two groups are perfect substitutes in production and firms do not discriminate between them.
The two groups di↵er in some characteristic that allows UI authorities to assign a UI extension to
group t but not to group n. Denote, respectively, by et and en the search e↵ort in case a worker
of group t and n gets unemployed. Since extended UI will induce workers to search less hard for a
new job, we have et < en. Equilibrium tightness is then ✓T = vT /(petutT +(1 p)enunT ), where vT
is the number of vacancies posted by firms and utT and unT are the number of unemployed workers
in each group. Moreover, if p is close to unity, ✓T ⇡ vT /etutT , and equilibrium tightness is close to
the one that would emerge if all workers in the labor market were treated.
How does this compare to a situation where the UI extension for group t is not implemented?
In that case, all unemployed workers will exert search e↵ort en, hence equilibrium tightness in
the non-treated labor market is ✓N = vN/(enuN ), where vN and uN are the (endogenous) stocks
of vacancies and unemployed workers when neither group t nor to group n are granted extended
benefits. (In that case, the distinction between workers of group t and n becomes irrelevant.)
This simple framework allows us to identify macro e↵ect, micro e↵ect and externality. Empir-
ically, we observe the job finding rates of eligible and non-eligible job losers in the treated region,
etf(✓T ) and enf(✓T ); and the job finding rate of job losers in the control regions, enf(✓N ). This
suggests the following decomposition
etf(✓T )  enf(✓N )| {z }
MACRO e↵ect
= [et   en]⇥ f(✓T )| {z }
micro e↵ect
+ en ⇥ [f(✓T )  f(✓N )]| {z }
externality
,
where the macro e↵ect is identified from comparing eligible workers in treated regions to workers
in control regions; the externality from comparing ineligible workers in treated regions to workers
in control regions; and the micro e↵ect from comparing eligible workers to non-eligible workers in
treated regions.
The Austrian Regional Extended Benefit Program. The Austrian Regional Extended Ben-
efit Program (REBP) provides us with an empirical design, which mimics the identification strategy
sketched above (Lalive, Landais and Zweimu¨ller 2015). The program granted extended UI benefit
in some regions, but did not implement extended UI in the rest of the country. Moreover, within
4In what follows, we assume that search e↵ort depends only on b but not on ✓. As emphasized by Shimer (2004)
labor market participation and measures of search intensity do not vary strongly over the business cycle, hence this
assumption seems reasonable.
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the treated region some workers were eligible, while others were not. This allows us to decompose
observed job finding rates along the above identification framework.
Of course, the above interpretation is only valid, if treated and control regions were initially
identical. They were not. In fact, the program was initiated because treated regions su↵ered from
structural economic problems. Many plants in these regions belonged to the state-owned industries
(mostly iron and steel), which faced a major crisis in the 1980s. Adverse demand shocks on inter-
national markets together with low productivity of the state-owned plants generated high financial
losses covered by taxpayers’ money. By the mid 1980s the government came to the conclusion
that this policy could no longer be pursued. Restructuring plans were set up, unproductive plants
were closed, and oversta↵ed plants were downsized. Because the concerned industries were strongly
concentrated in certain regions of the country, the Austrian government implemented the REBP to
protect older workers against economic hardships associated with the restructuring policies. More-
over, the program was not only confinded to workers previously employed in the steel industry but
was available to all unemployed workers in the treated region. The REBP extended the maximum
duration of UI benefits from 52 weeks to 209 (!) weeks. The eligibility criteria were the following:
• age 50 or older at the start of the UI spell,
• continuous work history (15 years of contributions to the UI system in the past 25 years),
• residence in one of 28 (out of 100) labor market districts for at least 6 months,
• unemployment spell started in June 1988 or later (including spells in progress in June 1988).
The program was in place from June 1988 until July 1993. Spells starting before August 1993
were still eligible to extended UI, meaning that the REBP was phased out gradually, with workers
eligible to the REBP in the unemployment pool up until July 1998.5
Figure 3
In sum, there are plenty of reasons why treated and control regions were not identical. Most
importantly, job losers from the steel industry were confronted with a substantially worse labor
market than other workers. This is why we remove steel workers from the sample. Even workers
outside the steel industry may di↵er in local labor market conditions due to local negative demand
spillovers. Di↵erent from the ideal experiment, the regions are not isolated (and observations
not independent from one another). Finally, regions di↵er in other dimensions such as industry
5Moroever, in 6 of the originally 28 treated regions, the program was already terminated with a 1992 reform. In
these districts, labor market conditions turned out not worse than non-treated regions, so that a continuation of the
program was not justified. Figure 3 shows the REBP communities in (communities with blue or dark-blue shading)
are all located on a contiguous area in the Eastern and Central parts of Austria. The 1992 reform left all claims in
progress una↵ected. For new entrants, the reform abolished the benefit extension in 6 of the originally 28 regions.
It also tightened eligibility criteria, as individuals had to be not only residents, but also previously employed in a
REBP region. In the figure, the dark-blue shaded areas are communities belonging to those 22 treated regions with
continuous treatment form June 1988 to July 1993, while the light-blue shaded areas are those 6 treated regions
where the program was abloshed in December 1991.
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structure and workforce composition, that may bias a regional comparison of otherwise similar
workers. When interpreting the evidence we have to keep this in mind. I will come back to some
of these caveats below.
Data and empirical evidence. In the empirical analysis, we use linked data from the universe
of the Austrian secial security database (ASSD) and the Austrian unemployment register (AMS).
We use all unemployment entrants aged 45-54 during the years 1980-2009, which includes both pre-
and post-treatment periods. Besides unemployment entrants from the iron and steel industries, we
also remove female unemployment entrants, because they were subject to di↵erent retirement rules.
The final sample consists of more than 260,000 unemployment spells.
Using the data described above we first compare eligible workers in treated regions to comparable
workers in control regions. In the ideal experiment this contrast identifies the macro e↵ect of
extended UI. Panel A of Figure 4 plots the di↵erence in unemployment durations between the two
groups by start date of the unemployment spell. The vertical axis measures the di↵erence in the
average duration of unemployment (in weeks) of job losers in treated regions compared to control
regions. The figure indicates huge di↵erences during the period of regional UI extensions.6 This
is not surprising given the high treatment intensity (maximum UI duration extended from 1 to 4
years). The figure also indicates that no regional di↵erences existed, neither before the program nor
after its termination. This suggests that the contrast is unlikely contaminated by di↵erential long-
run trends. Nevertheless, durations do increase slightly before and do not disappear immediately
after the program, which could be due to temporarily worse labor market conditions in the treated
labor market during the treatment period.
Figure 4
Let us now look at the contrast of particular interest here, ineligible workers in treated regions
versus comparable workers in control regions. This identifies the market externality. Panel B of
Figure 4 clearly shows that non-eligible workers in treated regions find jobs more quickly than
comparable workers in control regions. This means that the market externality is negative and
the micro e↵ect of extended UI exceeds the macro-e↵ect. The evidence is inconsistent with the
prediction of the DMP model which emphasizes the wage externality. The evidence is in line with
the job rationing model and indicates that search externalities are the dominant force.
It is also interesting to observe the dynamics of the externality over time. It takes some time
until the externality is built up and it only gradually disappears after the program is abolished.
Because eligibility is tied to the date of unemployment entry, workers entering immediately before
program termination can still be on extended UI until four years later (and therefore trigger UI
externalities even though the newly unemployed are no longer eligible to the REBP). This conjecture
is line with the evidence: regional di↵erences for non-eligible workers become gradually weaker and
disappear after four years.
6The first paper documenting the e↵ect of the REBP on unemployment durations is Winter-Ebmer (1998). Later
papers include Lalive and Zweimu¨ller (2004a,b) and Lalive (2008).
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As mentioned above, an obvious caveat threatening identification are di↵erential labor market
conditions between regions. While we removed steel workers, one might argue that in regions with
a strong steel sector there may be local demand spillovers which harm employment prospects also
for workers from other industries. Notice, however, that in the absence of such adverse demand
conditions non-eligible workers in treated regions would do even better and the absolute size of the
estimated externality would be even larger. In other words, the size of the externality shown in
Figure 4 is a lower bound.
Notice also that the evidence in Figure 4 only shows the raw di↵erences. A more elaborate di↵-
in-di↵ analysis, which appropriately controls for observed individual characteristics of job losers,
does not change the picture. Overall, the results turn out robust and show up for di↵erent outcome-
variables (unemployment duration, time between jobs, survivor rates, ...).
Explaining the size of UI market externalities. One important issue is that the size of the
externality depends on how strongly the labor market is treated by UI. This depends on the size of
the treated group as a fraction of the labor market. For instance, if only a tiny fraction of workers
in a labor market becomes eligible to extended UI, we can ignore externalities and the partial
equilibrium framework is appropriate. In contrast, if most workers are captured by extended UI,
ignoring externalities is problematic.
We can shed light on this issue by estimating how the estimated externality depens on the
relative size of the treated group. This can be done in various ways. First, we can take advan-
tage of the fact that REBP districts di↵er in connectedness with nonREBP regions (as measured
the fraction of workers from the control region hired by firms in the treated region). The idea is
that local labor markets with many hires from nonREBP regions are less intensely treated by UI
extensions, which should translate into weaker externalities. Indeed, we find that market external-
ities are smaller in more integrated districts. Second, we use as a treatment indicator the fraction
of 50+ workers that qualify for the REBP to split REBP counties into local labor markets with
high and low treatment intensity. We find that externalities are twice as large in cells with high
treatment intensity. Third, we can look at geographical spillovers. In the baseline results we have
excluded unemployed workers living in adjacent nonREBP districts. Workers from these districts
are not a valid control group as they are likely a↵ected by spillovers from the REBP region. This
o↵ers a further test for externalities of UI extensions: contrasting workers in adjacent districts (who
should be a↵ected by REBP due to spillovers) to workers in regions that are more isolated (and
who should be una↵ected from the REBP). Indeed, we find that UI extensions lead to significantly
shorter unemployment durations of unemployed workers in these adjacent districts (compared to
less integrated districts). The absolute size of the estimated geographical spillover e↵ect is smaller
than the baseline externality, in line with the idea that job search outcomes improve most where
competition with REBP workers was strongest.
Another interesting issue is how the estimated externalities vary with labor market tightness.
In theory, a weaker labor market is associated with larger search externalities because job rationing
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is more severe. In the extreme, when the number of jobs is fixed, a lower job finding rate of eligible
workers would be entirely o↵set by higher job finding non-eligible workers, keeping employment
constant. In general, a reduction in aggregate search e↵ort should therefore have a stronger e↵ect
on job finding in a slack than in a tight labor market. Using regional vacancy data to di↵erentiate
between more slack and more tight labor markets within the treated regions confirms that, indeed,
externalities are stronger in more slack labor markets.
The above e↵ects suggest that search externalities are important. Does this mean wage exter-
nalities can be ruled out altogether? Not necessarily, because the estimated externalities are a net
e↵ect. Direct identification of wage externalities is more di cult, because not all workers return
to the labor market and wage observations are selective. Moreover, a contrast of similar workers
in treated and non-treated regions may be contaminated to the extent that wage o↵ers decrease
with the duration of unemployment. When we plot post-unemployment wages by age, we see a
small spike at age 50 during the program, which does not show up in pre- and post-program times.
While this is consistent with a wage externality, it is more likely selectivity (workers with very good
wage o↵ers return to the labor market). Regression results do not indicate any significant regional
di↵erence in post-unemployment wages, holding the duration of the unemployment spell constant.
Overall, the evidence suggests that reemployment wages are unlikely strongly a↵ected by the UI
extension.
Policy implications. Our analysis reveals significant market externalities suggesting that the
micro e↵ect of extended UI is larger than the macro e↵ect. Quantitatively, our findings indicate
that the externality is large, roughly 20 percent of the size of the micro e↵ect. But this means that a
micro evaluation that does not take into account variations in labor market conditions overestimates
the increase in unemployment resulting from extended UI by as much as 20 percent.
In many instances we are interested in the e↵ect of UI on a labor market where all workers
are treated. This raises the question what can be inferred from the Austrian REBP which treated
only a subgroup. Compared to a situation where the entire labor market is treated, UI extensions
targeted to a subgroup create substitution opportunities. When the eligible group is small and/or
the substition elasticity with non-eligible workers is large, labor market tightness will not be strongly
a↵ected and market externalities of extended UI will be small. In fact, if the treated group is tiny,
we do not need to worry about general equilibrium responses and the partial-equilibrium framework
(the micro elasticity) captures the overall e↵ect of the program. Conversely, a UI extension for all
workers will likely yield a larger wedge between micro and macro e↵ects than a partial UI extension
like the Austrian REBP.
Finally, our results speak to the welfare implications of a UI policy that is more generous in
recession (as the current UI system in the US). As suggested by the theroretical work of Landais,
Michaillat, and Saez (2010) the Baily formula needs to be extended when externalities are impor-
tant. They show that, when extended UI increases labor market tightness, extended UI is desirable
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on e ciency grounds.7 This is exactly what we found in the context of the Austrian REBP: market
externalities are larger the lower initial labor market tightness. Hence our evidence suggests that
UI extensions should be extended in bad times.
3 Program substitution? UI and other benefits
So far, our analysis has focused on transitions between employment and unemployment. In
reality, of course, flows in and out of non-participation are at least as important. Moreover, many
non-participants qualify for benefits of other welfare state programs. Since extended UI increases
the generosity of UI relative to other programs, flows in (and out) of those other programs may be
a↵ected as well, generating fiscal externalities.
To insure against the income loss after UI benefit exhaustion, an unemployed worker may not
only search for a new job but also try to get access to other social insurance benefits. “Searching”
for other welfare benefits is perhaps particularly relevant for workers with soft disabilities (as
musculoskeletal disorders, mental health problems) – for whom working is possible but painful.
Moreover, when the DI system grants benefits not solely on the basis of health impairments but
also on “vocational factors” related the worker’s employability (occupation, age, skills,...), benefit
takeup in other programs may be a↵ected more strongly by changes in their relative generosity.
A small but growing literature has studied the impact of UI generosity relative to other pro-
grams. Autor and Duggan (2003) argue that long-run increase in the DI caseload observed in
the US is partly driven by increases in DI income replacement rates, which were associated with
higher labor force exit rates and reduced unemployment rates, particularly for displaced high-school
dropouts. Such evidence is not confined to the US. Petrongolo (2009) finds that the UK JSA reform
did not only decrease the number of UI benefit recipients, it also increased take-up of DI benefits.
Also studies from other countries suggest that program substitution is important.8
Early retirement and extended UI. We can again use the Austrian REBP as a quasi-
experiment to study the interaction of the UI system with other welfare programs, in particular the
DI system (Inderbitzin, Staubli, Zweimu¨ller 2016). As we will see, the REBP triggered not only
“program substitution” – lower takeup of DI benefits together with higher UI takeup – but also
“program complementarity”, a consecutive take-up of UI and DI benefits. Both of these responses
are closely related to early retirement choices.
7Strictly speaking, this proposition holds when unemployment is ine ciently high, i.e. the Hosios condition is
violated and a reduction in unemployment increases welfare. This is, of course, what we consider the economically
relevant case.
8Studies for Sweden (Karlstro¨m et al. 2008), the Netherlands (Borghans et al. 2014, Lammers et al. 2013),
Finnland (Kyyra¨ and Ollikainen 2008), and Austria (Staubli, 2011) suggest that program substitution might be
quantitatively important. See also the recent US study of Lindner (2016), who finds that higher UI benefits reduce
DI application and the e↵ect is quantitatively large. Mueller et al. (2016) and Rothstein and Valetta (2017) do not
find any major increase in DI takeup among US worker, who exhausted their UI benefit extensions implemented after
the Great Recession.
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Figure 5 summarizes the Austrian early-retirement rules for older job losers that prevailed
around 1990 and shows how eligibility to the REBP a↵ected these rules. At the time, the regular
male retirement age was age 60.9 Even without the REBP, existing early retirement provisions
allowed older job losers to exit the labor force as early as age 58. To bridge the time until age
60, when the regular old-age pension could be claimed, a worder aged 58 could draw regular UI
benefits for one year and then claim “special income support”, a (1-year) pre-retirement benefit for
long-term unemployed workers, available from age 59. The REBP made the existing system even
more generous. Eligible unemployed entrants could e↵ectively withdraw through the UI system as
young as age 55. Notice that the above pathway to retirement relies exclusively on UI, it does not
require takeup of DI benefits. Another way of permanently withdrawing from the labor force is
early retirement with DI. The DI system in place at the time granted relaxed DI access from age
55 onwards. “Relaxed access” here means that, if an applicant is no longer capable of working in
his previous occupation, he is no longer required to take jobs in other occupations. In other words,
from age 55 onwards, not only medical but also vocational criteria grant access to a DI pension.10
Figure 5
Incentives. Notice that extended UI and relaxed DI generates incentives that vary by age at
job loss. With extended UI, workers above age 55 who would have otherwise retired with DI, can
now entirely rely on the UI to bridge the time until the regular retirment age 60. This program
substitution incentive is particularly strong for workers who lose their job between ages 55 and 57,
where retirement without DI is only possible for workers qualifying for extended UI. The incentive
to substitute DI in favor of UI is strong for various reasons. First, retirement without DI can be
planned with certainty, while early retirement with DI involves a positive probability that a DI
application will eventually be rejected and retirement plans do not come true. Second, retirement
without DI avoids the hassle of medical checks and bureaucratic hurdles associated with DI take-up.
Finally, also financial incentives may induce a worker to substitute DI for UI. While takeup of UI
benefits does not necessarily a↵ect the amount of the subsequent public pension, retiring early with
DI is typically associated with a permanently lower public pension.11
The REBP also created stronger incentives for early retirements associated with DI takeup.
This was particularly so for job losers below age 54. As Figure 5 makes clear, even without the
REBP a worker could retire early (with DI) when losing the job at age 54, by claiming UI benefits
9The pension rules at the time gave access to a public pension at age 60, provided the worker had a continuous
work history (at least 35 years of pension contributions). The pension age (and pension rules) have been changed in
several successive pension reforms, starting in year 2000.
10At the minimum age of relaxed DI access the awards rate of a DI pension increases dramatically (Haller et al.
2017). The minimum age of relaxed access to DI was increased to 57 in 1996, and the 2013 disability reform (IP
Neu) implemented a stepwise increase of relaxed access to age 60 by the year 2018. Staubli (2011) and Haller et al.
(2017) show that these reforms had a substantial impact on labor supply between ages 55 and 60.
11The pension formula of the DI benefit was the same as for the public pension, with discounts for early retirement.
In contrast, drawing the exteded UI benefits did not involve any discounts in the public pension at age 60. While
the DI benefit is based on lifetime earnings (the best 5 years of earnings), the UI benefits is based on earnings of
the previous job UI benefits and DI benefits may di↵er. Workers with a higher UI benefit than the DI benefit, have
therefore an additional incentive of substituting DI for UI.
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for 12 months followed by a DI pension from age 55. With the introduction of the REBP this option
became available to job losers as young as 51. In other words, the REBP rules created program
complementarity incentives, i.e. the sequential takeup of extended UI and relaxed DI, particularly
for job losers aged 51-53. Notice that also job losers in the control region can exit the labor force
at age 54 by drawing the regular UI benefits during the first 52 weeks and followed by relaxed DI
(although they cannot rely on extended UI when the DI application is rejected). Therefore, we
expect a weaker e↵ect on retirements with DI for job losers aged 54 but strong e↵ects for job losers
aged 51-53.
In sum, early retirement incentives are strongest among workers in the age group 51-57. For
this age group, we expect more permanent withdrawals from the labor force. However, the early
retirement pathways are expected to di↵er by age of job loss. Due to program complementarity,
there should be more early retirements with DI among treated job losers aged 51-53 (with a weaker
e↵ect for job losers aged 54). Due to program substitution, there should be less early retirements
with DI for job losers aged 55-57.12
Empirical results. To shed light on the relevance of program substitution and program comple-
mentarity, we consider a somewhat broader age range as before, focusing on male job losers aged
50-57 with a UI claim between 1985 and 1995. We look only at men because women’s the minimum
pension age at the time was age 55 coiciding with the age for relaxed access to a DI pension. As a
result, incentives for women are quite di↵erent and were confined to ages 50-52 only.13
Just like before, we drop from the sample job losers who entered unemployment from a job in
the steel sector to rule out that worse labor market prospects in treated regions contaminate the
results. We also focus on eligible workers and drop non-eligible workers (with less than 15 years
of previous experience).14 Adopting the same interpretation as in our above analysis of UI search
externalities, a comparison of eligible workers between treated and control regions estimates the
macro e↵ect of the REBP on early retirement. We also looked at non-eligible workers in treated
regions, but could not find significant regional di↵erences in retirement responses for non-eligible
workers. This confirms that our above analysis of search externalities works along the intensive
margin (shorter unemployment durations for ineligible workers), rather than the extensive margin
(fewer labor force withdrawals among this group). Therefore we focus only on eligible workers
and their program substitution and complementarity choices to quantify the fiscal externalities
12In the above discussion we do not consider that all unemployed workers can rely on unemployment assistance
(UA) where their regular UI benefits have run out. However, this option is much less attractive. Not only are UA
benefits lower that UI benefits, they are also means-tested and associated with a stigma. In the data, we see also
responses to extended UI along the UA margin that are relevant for the cost calculation (see below).
13For female job losers, the REBP was a pure early retirement program. as many women took advantage of
extended UI which ensured a continuous benefit before the public pension could be claimed at age 55. Female job
losers in control regions could retire early already at age 53, claiming one year of regular UI benefits and another
year of special income support (that women could get already at age 54). Hence di↵erential incentives exist during
ages 50-52. Inderbitzin et al. (2016) show that, indeed early retirements without DI in the age group 50-52 increased
very strongly, while there are no such di↵erences from age 53 and higher.
14Focusing on eligible workers further implies all workers have a su ciently long work history which guarantees
that they will be eligible for special income support at age 59 and for an old-age pension at age 60.
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associated with extended UI.
Figure 6 documents the di↵erence in the incidence of early retirement by age, both in response to
introducing the program (the red graph) and to abolishing the program (the blue graph). In Panel A
we look at regional di↵erences in the proportion of early retirements after a job loss. The red graph
shows that early retirements increased strongly among job losers in response to the introduction of
extended UI. The fraction of job losers that eventually retired was up to 20 percentage points higher
in REBP regions. Corresponding to incentives, the higher incidence of early retirement is observed
in the expected ages (50-57), while there is no di↵erence in early retirements among workers below
age 50 and above age 57. Comparing the red and the blue graph reveals further that the e↵ect of
terminating extended UI is the mirror image of the e↵ect of introducing it. This implies that, after
the program is shut down, regional di↵erences in early retirement after job loss disappear.
It is particularly interesting to explore the extent to which the overall e↵ect on early retirements
involves takeup of DI. Panel B of Figure 6 shows that additional early retirements for workers 50-53
are almost entirely associated with DI takeup. This is clear evidence for program complementarity:
eligibility for extended UI induces many workers to take up UI and DI benefits sequentially to retire
early. Interestingly, the di↵erence in early retirements with DI is insignificant at age 54, consistent
with the incentives mentioned above. In contrast, there are fewer early retirements with DI at
ages 55-57. While these job losers retire more frequently in treated regions (Panel A), they do not
need to claim DI, they just need to stay on UI until retirement. This is clear evidence for program
substitution.15 Just like for all retirements (Panel A), we also see that regional di↵erences in early
retirement with DI are non-existent at ages younger than 50 and they disappear at ages 58 or 59.
The absence of any di↵erence between treated and controls at these ages confirms that di↵erential
retirement patterns are indeed driven by extended UI rather than by unobservables contaminating
the regional contrast. Similarly, the comparison of the red and the blue graph in Panel B indicates
e↵ects of a very similar order of magnitude (with opposite sign) of introducing and terminating
extended UI. Regional di↵erences in retirement patterns disappear after the regional extended UI
program is abolished.
Total costs and fiscal externalities. Fiscal costs to taxpayers arise because extended UI a↵ects
government expenditures not only through higher UI benefit payments and foregone taxes but also
because of changed takeup of DI and other programs. Since the ASSD dataset reports takeup of
DI and other social insurance benefits, we can estimate the overall fiscal costs of the REBP. This
can be done by using the same di↵-in-di↵ framework as before, using as the dependent variable the
respective fiscal cost components: foregone taxes, additional UI benefits, and other social insurance
benefits. We can calculate the fiscal costs, using the benefit formulas, the earnings history (which
enters the benefit formula) and the chosen retirement path. These outcomes are based on observed
15Conditional on permanently withdrawing from the work force, roughly 2/3 of workers in treated regions retire
without DI and 1/3 retire with DI. In control regions, the odds are opposite: roughly 1/3 retire without DI and 2/3
retire with DI. (Control workers, retiring without DI need to rely on unemployment assistance, UA, a means-tested
program with lower benefits and the stigma of needing help in a state of emergency, “Notstandshilfe”.)
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durations for each individual in the various states during ages 50-59 and assume a public pension
is drawn between ages 60 and 78 (the average life expectancy of men during that period). Based
on this procedure, we estimate the costs to the taxpayer of REBP treatment for job losers in the
age group 50-54 to be 13109 Euros per eligible worker. The corresponding cost for treating the age
group 55-57 are 9465 Euros per eligible worker aged 55-57.16
Taking into account the interaction of UI benefits with other programs turns out quantitatively
important. If we only consider additional UI benefits and foregone taxes but ignoring additional
costs (or cost reductions) in other programs, estimated fiscal costs of treating a job loser in the age
group 55-57 with extended UI are equal to 15847 Euros. This corresponds to overestimating the
fiscal costs by 15847 – 9465 = 6382 Euros or 67(!) percent. Interestingly, ignoring fiscal externalities
also leads to an overestimation of tax payer costs of REBP treatment also for age group 50-54.
While program complementarity increases DI costs substantially, there are cost reductions of old-
age benefits (retiring early is associated with a lower pension) and lower cost to the UA program
(for the long-term unemployed not eligible to extended UI), which dominate the higher DI costs.
Ignoring fiscal externalities, estimated costs are 14417 Euros per eligible job loser aged 50-54. This
overestimates fiscal costs by 14417 - 13109 = 1308 Euros or by 10 percent.
The above calculations suggest that total costs of the program are overestimated by 67 percent
for job losers aged 55-57 and by 10 percent for job losers aged 50-54. Weighting the two groups
as by sample size (0.72 for age group 50–54 and 0.28 for age group 55–57), we estimate the REBP
costs neglecting fiscal externalities to be 0.72⇥ 14417 + 0.28⇥ 15847 = 14817 Euros, while taking
fiscal externalities into account as 0.72 ⇥ 13109 + 0.28 ⇥ 9465 = 12088 Euros. Taken together, by
ignoring fiscal externalities we overestimate the governments costs of the Austrian REBP by as
much as 23 percent.
The more general message is that fiscal externalities may be quantitatively important. Neglect-
ing these costs can lead to a significant and quantitatively large bias in estimating the total costs
of more generous UI.
4 UI generosity and job separations
The existing literature has mainly studied the e↵ect of UI on the job finding rate. We usually
assume that changes in UI generosity leave the job separation rate una↵ected. The above discussion
of market externalities and fiscal externalities has followed this convention. However, it is by no
means clear that this assumption holds in reality. It is therefore of interest to take a closer look.
UI and job separations. An older literature has emphasized the importance of UI in long-term
employment relationships. In such contracts, firms have an incentive to exploit the UI system
for employment adjustments in case of negative demand shocks. The firm o↵ers the workers a
job package that includes the wage and a probability of being laid o↵. With more generous UI
16For details on the calculation of total additional costs to the government, see Inderbitzin et al. (2016).
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firms have an incentive to lay o↵ their workers more frequently, shifting a larger fraction of the
workers’ compensation to the UI system, thereby generating excessive layo↵s. The obvious remedy
against such moral hazard behavior on the firm side is experience rating, e.g. a system that makes
firms liable for all the costs accruing to the UI system. In reality, however, many UI systems
have no experience rating (as in many European countries) and systems where experience rating is
incomplete (as in the US).17
The argument, originally brought forth by Feldstein (1976), relies on seasonal demand shocks
which generate temporary layo↵s, though Baily (1977) mentions that similar arguments apply to
employment relationships at risk of a permanent layo↵.18 Hutchens (1999) argues that not only
the UI system but also early retirement programs may be part of an implicit contract between
firms and workers, with the possibility of a permanent layo↵s in case of an adverse shock to the
firm. If early retirement rules are very generous (and actuarially unfair),19 firms can shift worker
compensation partly to early retirement programs generating excess early retirement.
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) extend the standard DMP model for endogenous job destruc-
tion. In this framework, jobs are subject to idiosyncratic shocks and an employment relationship is
endogenously terminated as soon as a shock reduces the firm’s productivity below a critical level.
In such a framework, UI generosity a↵ects layo↵s. An increase in UI benefits puts an upward
pressure on wages and raises the reservation productivity. Hence there will be more layo↵s for a
given distribution of idiosyncratic shocks.20
While there is an older literature providing evidence for an impact of UI on layo↵s,21 recent em-
pirical evidence of the e↵ect of UI on the unemployment inflow is scarce. Interestingly, among the
few more recent studies is Winter-Ebmer (2003), who provides evidence in the context of the Aus-
trian REBP. He finds that the yearly transition rate from employment to unemployment increased
by about 10 percent for workers eligible to the REBP and that this response was concentrated
among long-tenured and high-wage blue collar workers. He argues that this evidence is consistent
with firms laying o↵ (expensive) workers in long-term contracts.22 More recently, Grogger and
17Layo↵s are a↵ected by the marginal implicit tax. The cuto↵s of the US experience rating schedule imply that
for a large fraction of firms the marginal layo↵ tax is zero, thus generating excessive layo↵s (although the system
imposes a positive average layo↵ tax on firms).
18A related literature emphasizing implicit contract in the labor market argues that the UI system can be exploited
when firms are risk neutral and workers are risk-averse. Unemployment insurance is an important element of the
implicit contract and increased generosity of the UI system may increase the incidence of layo↵s.
19An important element in Hutchens’ (1999) model is the fact that early retirement rules are not actuarially fair.
A worker retiring one year earlier gets a smaller reduction in benefits than the reduction that would leave social
security wealth (the present value of pension benefits) unchanged at given market interest and mortality rates. A
higher degree of acturial unfairness makes workers more willing to retire early, which firms can exploit in implicit
contracts.
20See also the theoretical paper by Mortensen (1990), who studies the role of UI in search and matching model
where both inflow into and outflow from unemployment are simultaneously analyzed.
21There are several early papers looking at the importance of UI for temporary and permanent layo↵s in the US.
See Feldstein (1978), Topel (1983), Sa↵er (1983), Katz and Meyer (1990), Anderson and Meyer (1993).
22Winter-Ebmer (2003) uses a 2-percent sample of the ASSD universe covering the period 1986 to 1991. Because
the pre-REBP period covers only one year, it more di cult to disentangle the change in inflow due to UI generosity
from the e↵ect of adverse labor market conditions. See also Lalive and Zweimu¨ller (2004b) providing a descriptive
analysis of inflow and outflow e↵ects of the REBP and Lalive, van Ours and Zweimu¨ller (2011) examining the e↵ect
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Wunsch (2012) study a German UI policy reform that strongly reduced UI benefit duration for
older workers. They find a positive “last-minute” increase in the unemployment inflow, suggesting
for workers taking advantage of the generous UI rules before they were terminated.
Another reason why UI generosity may a↵ect the unemployment inflow are employment re-
quirements for UI eligibility. Christofides and McKenna (1995), Baker and Rea (1998), and Britto
(2015) find that UI rules and UI generosity have a strong impact of employment durations (and
the probability of job separation). Christofides and McKenna (1996) find large spikes in job-to-
unemployment transition rates at the critical employment durations that grant UI eligibility.
REBP e↵ect on transitions from employment to unemployment. We now provide sug-
gestive evidence of a REBP e↵ect on the UI inflow. In Figure 7 we consider individuals who held a
job at age 49 and ask whether they still work on the same job at age 55. Since we can rely on the
universe of employees, we can look at a fine grid, month/year of birth. The dashed line shows how
intensely a cohort was treated by extended UI. For instance, a worker born in the third quarter
of 1938 was already covered by the REBP losing his job at age 50 (in the third quarter of 1988);
and was still covered by the REBP when losing the job before turning 55 (in the second quarter of
1993). In contrast, a worker born before July 1933 (after July 1943) was too old (too young) for
REBP eligibility when losing the job between ages 50 and 55.
Figure 7
The red graph in Figure 7 shows the regional di↵erence in the probability that a worker who
held a job at age 49 still holds this job at age 55. Cohorts not insured through the REBP during
ages 50-54 – either because they were too young or because they were too old – show slightly
higher job stability than workers in the control regions. The graph does not only suggest that the
REBP had a significant impact, it also suggests that treatment intensity matters a lot: Cohorts
continuously insured during ages 50-54 have a substantially higher probability to separate from
the job they held at age 49. A possible explanation for this is indeed moral hazard by firms who
exploit UI to partly compensate workers in implicit long-term contracts. Notice, however, that the
evidence is also consistent with moral hazard by workers deciding voluntarily to quit their job and
to take advantage of generous UI (and perhaps exit the labor force).23
As mentioned above, existing evidence points to the importance of eligibility requirements as
driving the unemployment inflow. The argument is that, when workers pass the eligibility threshold,
they are more likely to enter unemployment and take up unemployment benefits. The important
eligibility threshold in the Austrian REBP is age. When workers are younger than 50 at the date
of job loss, they are eligible to extended UI benefits but job losers younger than 50 are subject to
of UI policy changes on the unemployment inflow using Austrian policy changes.
23More precisely, the dashed line shows, for each cohort, the number of months between ages 50:00 (= age 50
years plus 0-1 months) and age 54:11 (= age 50 years plus 11-12 months) at which a worker is insured by the REBP
against job loss. Obviously, the indicator ranges from 0 to 60 months. Because employment is measured at quarterly
frequency (baseline dates are Feb 15, May 15, Aug 15, Nov 15), while birth cohorts are measured in monthly frequency,
small rounding errors may occur for cohorts turning 50 or 55 around the start or termination of the program.
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regular UI benefits (maximum benefits duration of 52 weeks rather than the 209 weeks granted by
the REBP). This suggests a discontinuity test for the relevance of miminum eligiblity requirements
(Figure 8).
Figure 8
Panel A of Figure 8 shows the di↵erence in quarterly unemployment inflow rates between treated
and control regions before the treatment period (1983-1988). The inflow rates are plotted over the
age range 45-55, and age is measured at a fine grid, year-quarter. Before the REBP went into e↵ect,
we see only a slight di↵erence across treated and control region and, importantly, we do not see
any discontinuity at age 50. Note also that 50-54 years old workers in treated regions have slightly
more stable jobs (broadly in line with Figure 7 above).
Panel B of Figure 8 shows the age pattern of job separation rates during the treatment period
(1988-1993). Now we see a sharp discontinuity at age 50, suggesting that minimum-age requirement
plays a decisive role for the unemployment entry. Notice also that the e↵ect is quantitatively large.
The mean of the quarterly job-to-unemployment transition rate was about 2 percent in the pre-
treatment period and the treatment e↵ect is on the order of magnitude of 1 percent, a 50 percent
(!) increase.
Relative importance of inflow- and outflow responses. It is interesting to put the inflow
results into perspective by comparing them to unemployment exit rates (Figure 9). First, we
plot the exact same graph as in Figure 8, but instead of inflow rates we now plot the quarterly
unemployment outflow rates on the vertical axis. Panel A of the figure shows no major di↵erences
in outflow rates in the pre-treatment period, while Panel B documents huge increases during the
REBP period in the outflow rate for eligible workers in the treated region, that start immediately
after age 50, as suggested by the incentives created through the program.
Figure 9
How important are the responses of outflow rates to more generous UI relative to the responses
of the UI inflow? To shed light on this question, let us do the following calculation. Denoting by
i the unemployment inflow rate and by o the outflow rate, the steady-state unemployment rate





Taking the pre-reform means of quarterly inflow and outflow rates, i = 0.02 and o = 0.53, the
pre-reform steady-state unemployment rate is equal to u0 = 0.02/(0.02 + 0.53) = 3.6%. This may
seem low, but corresponds to the low unemployment rates that prevailed also for older workers
during the 1980s in Austria. (Here we have to keep in mind that these numbers are calculated
from the ASSD excluding steel workers and abstracting from early retirement flows). From Panel
B in Figures 8 we see that the response of the inflow rate to increased UI generosity was roughly
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4i ⇡ +0.01 (1 percentage point), while the average response of the outflow rate was was roughly
4o ⇡  0.27 (27 percentage points). This suggests that, as a consequence of the REBP treatment,
the unemployment rate has tripled u1 = 0.03/(0.03 + 0.26) = 10.3%.
The outflow e↵ect can be assessed from the hypothetical unemployment rate that would have
emerged due to outflow responses only, keeping the inflow rate at its pre-treatment level. This
yields a hypothetical unemployment rate of uo1 = 0.02/(0.02 + 0.26) = 7.1%, while the inflow
e↵ect can calculated in an anlogous way, generating a hypothetical unemployment rate of ui1 =
0.03/(0.03 + 0.53) = 5.3%. This increase in the steady-state unemployment rate of 4u ⇡ 6.7%
can be decomposed into an outflow e↵ect 4uo ⇡ 3.5%, an inflow e↵ect of 4ui ⇡ 1.7% and an
interaction e↵ect 4uio ⇡ 1.5%. While the outflow e↵ect is clearly the dominant one, it accounts
for “only” about 53 percent of the overall increase in unemployment. This is because the inflow
e↵ect is substantial, making up roughly 25 percent of the overall increase in the unemployment rate.
Moreover, a non-negligible fraction of the predicted increase in the unemployment rate, about 15
percent, is due to the fact the inflow and outflow e↵ect reinforce one another.
Policy implications. The fact that UI has a substantial impact on job separations does not
necessarily mean that we should reduce UI generosity. The policy implications depend on the nature
of job separations. If generous UI is exploited by firms o↵ering long-term contracts associated with
(temporary or permanent) layo↵s and early retirements, the obvious remedy to excessive layo↵s
is an experience-rating system reducing layo↵ rates to their socially optimal level (Feldstein 1976,
Baily 1977, Hutchens 1999). In contrast, if the e↵ect of UI generosity on job separations is because
workers quit more frequently, this moral hazard behavior indeed implies that optimal UI should be
less generous (Britto 2015).
5 Was the Austrian REBP too generous?
We have not yet discussed whether implementing the Austrian REBP was an optimal policy,
taking into account the various channels through which extended UI a↵ected the labor market. To
answer this question we need to adapt an extended optimal benefit formula which takes account
of labor market responses – in addition to the lower search e↵ort by eligible workers – which a↵ect







where CT are the total fiscal costs and CM the (hypothetical) mechanical costs that would arise in
the absence of behavioral responses.24 Similar to the Baily-formula, the extended formula implies
24The hypothetical costs CM can be calculated using the control group as the counterfactual for the behavior of
the treated group in the absence of the REBP. Holding labor supply of this group constant, we calculate the di↵erence
with and without the REBP. The mechanical costs thus calculate mainly capture the additional costs by providing
UI benefits for those who have exhausted UI benefits in the absence of the REBP. The estimated costs are the labor
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that optimal UI grants full insurance b = w in the absence of behavioral responses, i.e. when
CT = CM . Unlike the basic Baily formula, the extended formula takes into account externalities.
Taking the cost estimates presented at the end of section 3, we have CT = 12087 Euros and
CM = 1713 Euros, so that the l.h.s. of the formula is equal to 6.06. Notice that these calculations
take externalities into account. Market externalities are captured because CT and CM are calculated
from a comparison of treated and control region. This contrast, as we have assumed in Section 2
above, captures the macro e↵ect of UI. Thus CT and CM capture both the micro e↵ect and the
market externality. Fiscal externalities are taken into account because the cost calculations include
the additional costs (or cost reductions) associated with changes in takeup of other programs.
Notice further, that the cost estimates do not take into account additional program costs due to
the increased unemployment inflow. Since a higher unemployment incidence generates additional
costs to the government, the above estimate of 6.06 for the r.h.s. of the above optimal UI formula
should be considered as a lower bound.25
To derive an estimate of the insurance value provided by the REBP we proceed in a standard
way. We assume that the utility function is CRRA , u(c) = c1  /(1  ), which allows us to rewrite
the l.h.s. of the above optimal UI formula as RR     1, where RR = b/(w   ⌧) is the UI. Notice
that RR here captures the replacement rate over a 5-year interval, implying RR = 0.42 of the
initial system without the REBP.26 We can now calculate the critical degree of risk aversion,  ⇤,
justifying the implementation of a UI system than is more generous than the pre-REBP system.
Under the above assumptions, this implies  ⇤ = 2.25. Because the costs are a lower bound, this
estimated value of risk is also a lower bound. This leads us to conclude that the Austrian REBP
was too generous.
6 What have we learned?
Let me conclude. I have discussed several channels through which UI a↵ects the labor market
– in addition to the e↵ect of UI on unemployment durations that is commonly emphasized in the
literature. I have argued that
• UI generosity may change the labor market equilibrium generating market externalites. The
size and direction of these externalities have important implications for the optimal design
market states of To calculate the increase in mechanical costs M, we take the labor supply of the control group as
a counterfactual for the treatment group in the absence of behavioral responses and calculate the di↵erence in net
expenditures with and without the REBP.
25Notice that it is not clear how the additional costs arsing from a higher unemployment inflow should be captured
in the optimal UI formula. Ine ciently high layo↵s do not necessarily imply a less generous UI system, since experience
rating may remove the distortion, while additional costs due to higher quits should be considered just like costs arising
from longer unemployment durations. In other words, a comprehensive welfare analysis needs to split the inflow e↵ects
into quit- and layo↵-responses. This is work in progress, see Ja¨ger et al. (2017).
26Our calibration takes Austrian UI rules around 1990. Without the REBP, the five-year replacement ratio is
based on 1/5 UI benefits and 4/5 unemployment assistance (UA) benefits; with the REBP, we have 4/5 UI benefits
and 1/5 UA benefits. We assume a net replacement rate of UI benefits of 55 percent and a net replacement rate of
UA benefits of 38.5 percent, or 70 percent of UI benefits. Hence, the five-year net replacement rate of UI benefits
without the REBP is RR = 1/4 × 0.55 + 4/5 × 0.385 = 0.42.
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of UI policies, including UI generosity over business cycle. In the context of the Austrian
REBP, these externalities are negative and quantitatively important, amounting to about 20
percent of the micro e↵ect of extended UI.
• UI is only one among a whole menu of welfare state programs. In the context of the Aus-
trian REBP, we have seen that this creates both program substitution and program comple-
mentarity. Detailed calculations of costs to these other programs suggest that overall fiscal
externalities are negative and quantitatively large, amounting to more than 20 percent of the
costs of UI payments and foregone taxes.
• increasing UI generosity increases job separations and the unemployment inflow, thus gener-
ating additional costs to the UI system. Moreover, the inflow e↵ect may be quantitatively
large. The Austrian REBP generated an inflow e↵ect accounting for more than 25 percent of
the overall increase in unemployment due to extended UI.
As mentioned in the introduction, the above results should be considered as an illustration. They
are estimated from a specific program, for a particular group of workers, in a country that has
a well developed welfare state. It is not clear, to which extent these results are more generally
relevant and externally valid.
While the quantitative e↵ects and the relative importance of the above channels may be very
di↵erent in other environments and for di↵erent groups of workers, I have strong doubts that these
channels can be neglected in other contexts. For instance, among the few papers studying UI market
externalities is Marinescu (2017), who finds negative market externalities from UI extensions on the
US labor market of a similar order of magnitude as those for Austria discussed above. Similarly,
Lawson (2015) estimates negative fiscal externalities of UI generosity (via the DI system) for the US,
which are substantially larger than those found here. Finally, there is an older empirical literature
documenting that UI a↵ects layo↵s. While this literature has not been very active recently, I find
it hard to believe that this channel is no longer relevant today.
Let me conclude with five more general messages, which I think arise from the research presented
above.
1. A clean causal estimate of the unemployment duration elasticity is not enough for policy
advice. If market and fiscal externalities, inflow e↵ects and possibly further channels are
quantitatively relevant, these responses need to be taken into account when assessing the
welfare e↵ect of UI.
2. We need to better understand the general equilibrium e↵ects of UI. Here I confined the
analysis to general equilibrium e↵ects that materialize on the labor market through market
externalities. But there may be further channels (e.g. the role of UI as an automatic stabilizer
over the business cycle), through which UI a↵ects equilibrium outcomes.27
27For interesting recent work in this area, see Di Maggio and Kermani (2016) and Kekre (2017).
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3. UI interacts with other welfare state programs. These interactions may be complex. Their
importance may vary for di↵erent groups in the population; and also across countries due to
the large di↵erences in welfare state provisions. It is important to take takeup responses of
other welfare state programs into account when evaluating the optimality of an existing UI
program.
4. The e↵ect of UI generosity on quits and layo↵s is an underresearched topic. Unlike the older
UI literature of the 1970s and 1980s, there are only few recent papers studying the impact
of UI on the unemployment inflow. However, these responses are potentially important.
Moreover, disentangling firm- and worker-driven responses may be important for optimal UI
policy.
5. We know very little about firm responses to UI generosity. In particular, we need to better
understand how changes in UI generosity a↵ect firms’ vacancy postings, hires, layo↵s, and
wage policies. New data sources (e.g. online job board data and matched firm-worker data
linked to vacancy and UI data) can bring new insights into this blank research area.
I think that empirical evidence along the above lines will constitute progress, not only for UI
research but for labor market research in general. I am confident we will see interesting work in
these areas over the next years.
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Figure 3: REBP and nonREBP regions in Austria
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Figure 4: Di↵erence in unemployment durations: REBP versus nonREBP regions
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Figure 6: Early retirement after job loss, by age at unemployment entry
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Figure 8: Di↵-in-di↵ estimates of REBP inflow e↵ect, by age at job loss
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Figure 9: Di↵-in-di↵ estimates of REBP unemployment outflow e↵ect, by age at job loss
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